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Free trade in audio-visual services has faced opposition on the grounds that foreign media undermine
domestic culture, and ultimately, global diversity. Using a long panel of French birth registries, we assess the
media–culture link using name frequencies as a measure of tastes. Controlling for the number of people who
currently have a name and unobserved name effects, our regressions show that media inﬂuences choices via
selective imitation. Parents are much more likely to adopt media names that they associate with youth. Using
estimated parameters, we simulate our model of name choice to reveal that, absent foreign media, fewer
than 5% of French babies would have been named differently. Our simulations also suggest a positive effect of
foreign media on the welfare of parents.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
“Nearly every country in the world is grappling with the question
of how to maintain its cultural identity at a time when ‘global
culture’ is washing over the earth.” Sheila Copps, 1997, as Minister
of Canadian Heritage
1. Introduction
Following the GATT's success in reducing trade barriers on
industrial goods, emphasis in multilateral negotiations has shifted to
areas, like agriculture and services, where future progress faces severe
political obstacles. One of the most contentious issues relates to
liberalization of trade in cultural goods and services. On the one hand,
countries such as the United States would like to see television
programs and ﬁlms subjected to the same requirements for national
treatment and non-discrimination as standard commodities. Oppos-
ing this, countries such as France and Canada have advocated a
“cultural exception.” For example, with strong French and Canadian
support, but against US opposition, a 2005 UNESCO conference
overwhelmingly approved a new Convention on cultural diversity
that asserted the right of a nation to provide public ﬁnancial
assistance to protect cultural diversity within its territory.1 Article
8 of the United Nations Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity
upholds the Franco-Canadian view: “cultural goods and services
which, as vectors of identity, values and meaning, must not be treated
as mere commodities or consumer goods.”2
Cultural exceptions might be dismissed as just another form of
protectionism. However, as pointed out byMas-Colell (1999), cultural
goods seem to have some distinguishing attributes. Unlike typical
goods, individuals not only know what they prefer, they also have
preferences over the preferences of others. Bisin and Verdier (2001)
emphasize that parents exert effort to pass their own cultural traits on
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to their children. A growing literature ﬁnds that the standard
presumption for free trade may not apply for cultural goods. Francois
and van Ypersele (2002) show that losses from trade can occur in a
model where the cultural good is characterized by ﬁxed costs and
heterogenous valuations. Bala and Van Long (2005) model the
evolution of preferences using replicator dynamics and show that a
large country's preferences can extinguish the preferences of its
smaller trading partner.
Three recent papers explore the relationship between culture and
trade in models where individuals derive utility from adhering to a
cultural identity. Janeba (2007) shows that, because cultural identity is
like a network externality, it is possible for trade liberalization to lower
welfare. Rauch and Trindade (forthcoming) extend the consumption
externalities approach to consider innovation in cultural goods. They
argue that “by preserving cultural diversity, protection of cultural goods
production can generate dynamic welfare gains that offset the static
welfare losses it causes.” Olivier et al. (2008) consider the dynamic
evolution of cultural identity and ﬁnd that the opportunity to trade
cultural goods leads each country to move towards different mono-
cultures. Their model is not designed to generate aggregate welfare
conclusions, but it does point towards a tensionwithin societies as trade
leads to the displacement of one of the autarky cultural identities.
The emerging theoretical literature on culture and trade motivates
the need for empirical evidence on this relationship. While Guiso et al.
(2006) present a range of evidence that cultural similarity stimulates
economic exchange, there is almost no econometric evidence that
international trade affects culture.3 Instead, the notion that foreign
cultural goods transform domestic tastes, thereby undermining
cultural diversity, seems to be based entirely on casual observation.
This paper brings statistical evidence to the culture and trade
debate by examining whether media exposure—of which imports of
audio-visual services constitute a growing share—change parental
choices for the names of their babies. We estimate that the popularity
of a ﬁrst name in France increases by about 10% when a performer or
character with that name appears on one of three main media
(movies, television, and songs). Foreign media exert an uneven
inﬂuence on naming patterns in France. In counterfactual simulations
that completely remove foreign media, over 95% of children receive
the same names. However, because media exposure is estimated to
have stronger impacts on names that have only recently come into
use, a subset of names receive a substantial boost in the simulations.
Names have some useful advantages as measures of cultural traits.
First, they are consistently and carefully measured (being recorded for
virtually everyone by birth registries) over time. Other traits, such as
clothing styles or religious beliefs, tend to be difﬁcult to quantify or
poorly measured. Second, names are freely available and ﬁrms have
no proﬁt motive to inﬂuence their popularity. This contrasts with, for
example, toys, where makers consciously attempt to raise demand via
pricing and advertising strategies. Most importantly, there is evidence
that names given to children are expressions of cultural identity. For
example, Fryer and Levitt (2004) observe that the rapid growth in the
use of distinctively Black names might be attributable to a desire by
Blacks to “accentuate and afﬁrm Black culture.” They invoke the
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) model where following identity-
appropriate norms of behavior raises utility.4
Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the
name data, French regulation of name choice, and trends in naming
practices. Section 3 proposes a model of name selection. Section 4
presents our econometric results. Section 5 simulates a counterfactual
name distribution in the absence of foreign media. We conclude by
reconsidering the merits of a “cultural exception” for trade in audio-
visual services in light of our results.
2. Naming regulations and regularities
We start by describing the nature and characteristics of our
naming data, which guide our choices on the construction of the
dependent variable, and other general issues, such as sample duration,
and various approaches to endogeneity concerns.
The data on name frequencies were collected by the French
national statistical agency, INSEE, using birth registries. The data set
provides the number of babies born in France by name, sex, and year
from 1900 to 2002. The panel includes several thousand names each
year—every name that was given at least three times. INSEE codes
names given to two or fewer children as “rare.” The variable we wish
to explain is the share of children of a given sex who receive name k in
year t. We use the subscript k to denote a name–sex combination,
implying that “Camille” is considered a different name when given to
a boy from when it is given to a girl. Furthermore, the data set deﬁnes
names as distinct spellings (not sounds), meaning that “Camille” and
“Camylle” are treated as different names.
Until 1993 French parents chose names for their children subject
to regulations that date back to 1803.5 Napoleonic legislation
permitted names drawn from the following set: Saints in French
calendars, historical ﬁgures from ancient Greece and Rome, and
Biblical names. The civil registrars charged with enforcing the law
were given the discretion to allow some regional and foreign names as
well as some spelling variations. If the registrars refused to register a
name, parents would have to appeal this decision in court. A
ministerial directive in 1966 urged registrars to show greater
tolerance for new names, including foreign names. Using “prudence,”
the ofﬁcials might accept some diminutives (Ginette for Geneviève),
contractions (Marianne for Marie-Anne), and spelling variations
(Magdeleine for Madeleine). Legislation on January 8, 1993 dramat-
ically shifted the rules. Now parents can choose any name and register
it immediately. If the civil registrars deem a name to be contrary to the
interest of the child, they can challenge it in court.
In our regression analysis and simulations, we use only the period
where regulations did not strictly constrain the choice of names. We
consider both 1967–2002 and 1993–2002 time spans. The former has
the advantage of length and therefore more variation in media
exposure. The latter permits an analysis with almost no government-
imposed constraints on the choices.
We now turn to distinctive patterns of our data that help guide our
analysis, in particular by pointing out trends and determinants in
naming behavior, and potential endogeneity issues. Fig. 1 shows the
decline of traditional names, the steady rise of “rare” names, and the
rise in American names starting in the 1970s. To deﬁne the set of
traditional names in France, we made use of the Napoleonic
legislation, which explicitly authorized the typical French spellings
of the names of Saints from ofﬁcial calendars. Parents have been
gradually moving away from Saint names. In 1946 almost three
quarters of children received Saint names (down from 86% in 1900).
The Saint share had a post-War revival and reached a local maximum
in 1964, three years before the ministerial directive that loosened
restrictions on names. By 2002, the Saint share had declined to 41%.
The share of “rare” names (those given to fewer than three children in
a year) has risen steadily from less than 1% in 1946 to 6% in 2002.
The pattern observed for French usage of common names in the US
deﬁes simple explanations. In 1946 almost 60% of French babies
received names that were also among the top 1000 US names. This
reﬂected names that have long been widely used in both countries
3 A very recent draft by Maystre et al. (2008) shows that bilateral trade in goods
affects the similarity in responses to 12 questions related to intergenerational
transmissions of values from parents to children in the World Values Survey.
4 The choice of a distinctively Black name appears to be costly: Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) ﬁnd that employers are less likely to respond positively to (fake)
job applicants whose resumes use Black names. Figlio (2005) ﬁnds that teachers are
less likely to refer Black-named students to a gifted program.
5 See http://www.babyfrance.com/prenoms/legislation.php for more detail (in
French).
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such as Daniel, Robert, Marie, and Nicole. Even more stereotypical
French names, like Pierre, are included in the US top 1000. However,
all the names cited above experience dramatic declines in the post-
war period. The rise in French usage of top-1000 US names beginning
in 1971 draws mainly from a new set of names (Kevin, Thomas, and
Laura are examples of top-ranked names in France during this period).
Since the decline of traditional names (Saints) and the rise of
alternative sets (US and rare) coincides with broader penetration of
television and foreign media more generally, it is tempting to link
these trends. It hardly needs to be pointed out that other social factors
could contribute to these trends such as declining church attendance,
non-Catholic immigration, rising tourism, and foreign-language
education. Since identiﬁcation from aggregate time-series data is
doomed to be unconvincing, our approach exploits the name-level
variation in media exposure.
Even using this additional dimension of the data, positive asso-
ciations between media exposure and contemporaneous name
popularity could arise for non-causal reasons. One issue is what
French sociologists Besnard and Desplanques (2004) refer to as the
“illusions of coincidences.” For example, Brigitte was the number one
name in 1959 (ending Marie's reign of at least 58 years), three years
after the release of And God Created Woman starring Brigitte Bardot.
Kevin was the number one name for French boys in 1990, the same
year as Kevin Costner starred in the Oscar-winning Dances With
Wolves. Many assume that Bardot and Costner were responsible for
the popularity of the names Brigitte and Kevin in France. However, our
data show that use of these names began to rise before the actors in
question had released any movies. We respond to the concern over
coincidences by using a large panel of names and years inwhich only a
minority of the names were exposed to media in any given year. This
allows us to test whether the media-treated names were signiﬁcantly
more popular than the control set.
The examples above relate to actors whose names were chose by
their parents almost two decades before their screen careers began.
Lieberson (2000) points out that the writers creating character names
and the actors adopting stage names select names based in large part
on their perceived associations. This implies that associations in the
public mind can determine media name exposure, rather than vice-
versa. Put more generally, media name exposure is endogenous and
responds to shocks that affect popularity of names with parents,
leading to inconsistent OLS estimates of the causal effect of media
exposure.
We use a case study of the name Thierry to illustrate the potential
for endogenous media exposure. Many French people attribute the
rise of the name “Thierry” to the show Thierry la Fronde. As shown in
Fig. 2, the name peaked in popularity while the show was being
broadcast (on the sole French station at the time, ORTF). The ﬁgure
makes it clear, however, that Thierry became a popular name well
before the TV show was broadcast. Thus, it may have been a common
shock to tastes affecting both parents and writers that lead to the name
being chosen for the protagonist of the show.
Fig. 2 also illustrates the endogeneity of actor and singer names.
The tick marks along the bottom of the ﬁgure show years in which we
observe a Thierry performing in one of the threemedia (cinema, TV, or
radio). Given the popularity of Thierry as a baby name in the 1960s, it
is not surprising that actors with that name become common in the
1980s and 1990s.
Reverse causationwherein popular birth names affect the set of actor
names usually occurs with long lags. On the other hand, there can be
feedback in theshort-run fromanamebeing seenasdesirable byparents
for their children to the name being seen as appealing for script-writers
for their characters. An intermediate case occurs when a performer
adopts a “stage” name. For example, the singer Catherine Bodet changed
her surname to Lara at some point prior to her 1972 debut album. She
enters ourmediadata set at least a decadeafter changinghernamewhen
two of her songs reach the Top 100 in France in 1984 and 1986.
We have two types of solutions to these endogeneity concerns. The
ﬁrst involves a set of controls for characteristics of names (some of
which are observable, while others are not) that simultaneously
determine their attractiveness to parents and writers. To remove the
feedback from past shocks in name popularity to current media
exposure, our regressions control for what we call “social exposure,”
an estimate of the size of the French population with a given name. In
addition, our preferred speciﬁcations use name-level ﬁxed effects to
control for unobserved characteristics of names that remain constant
over the estimation period. This speciﬁcation identiﬁes media effects
via within co-variation in name popularity and media exposure.
Our second approach to endogeneity issues is to identify sets of
names for which simultaneity is likely to beminimal.Whilewe cannot
rule out (even with the set of controls described) the inﬂuence of
contemporaneous shocks affecting writers and parents in general, we
argue that this simultaneity issue is much less of a concern with
respect to actors than roles. This is because actors and singers
generally retain the same stage names throughout their careers and
many actors (Brigitte Bardot and Catherine Deneuve, for example) use
their birth names. Thus, if one can control for past popularity of a
name, the current appearance in the media of an actor with that name
should have a causal effect on parent choices. The simultaneity bias
therefore predicts that role names should have larger estimated
coefﬁcients than actor names (after controlling for social exposure).
The difference between foreign and domestic media can also be
useful in this context. While both domestic and foreign screen writers
Fig. 1. The decline of traditional names. Fig. 2. The rise and fall of “Thierry”.
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can invent new character names, the actors in domestic productions
are much more likely to have traditional French names. Also, if
authors choose names for their characters based on current
popularity, they should do so based on the frequency of a name in
their domestic market. With foreign media, therefore, the simultane-
ity bias between writer and parent name choices is expected to be of
minimal importance. Our regressions will therefore distinguish media
effects from performers (as opposed to characters), and foreign media
(as opposed to domestic). In both cases, and after controlling for social
exposure, we expect the endogeneity bias to be small.
Fig. 3 illustrates the type of relationship that one would expect if
media indeed has a true causal effect on naming patterns. The ﬁgure
considers the inﬂuence of an American television show that was very
popular in France, Beverly Hills 90210. This show ran in the US from
1990 to 2000. Of the fourmain characters, Brandon, Brenda, and Dylan
rose in popularity immediately after the show was released in France
in 1993. In contrast, the frequency of Kelly hardly changed. Kelly had
already grown before—part of her rise seems attributable to the
release of an earlier show, Santa Barbara, in 1985. Names such as
Brandon or Dylan sound very American to French ears and have been
typical examples presented by people arguing that the inﬂuence of
foreign media on French culture was becoming excessive.6 Indeed,
Dylan climbed up to sixth position in 1996.
We ﬁnd these illustrations of the possibility of media-enhanced
name diffusion intriguing, but hardly convincing. Even if a media
ﬁgure were found that appeared with exactly the right timing to
explain the surge in a particular name's popularity, this could arise
because of non-random selection, or “data-mining.” This is why we
need more rigorous regression analysis, using the full sample of
names given in the country over a large number of years, combined
with information on which of those names where actually media-
exposed and when. The next section presents the framework that
guides our estimation.
3. Empirical model of name choice
This section develops an empirical framework that incorporates
media effects within a broader model of name choice. It is designed to
permit estimation of name choice parameters, so that the model can
then be used to simulate counterfactuals.
A continuum of parents, denoted i, select names for babies born in
year t from a common choice set Ct. Utility from name k depends
additively on commonly perceived attributes vkt and on an idiosyn-
cratic parent-preference term denoted kt(i):
UktðiÞ = vkt + ktðiÞ: ð1Þ
To obtain a closed-form share formula, it is necessary to assume
that kt(i) is distributed as a type-I extreme value. For generality, we
specify the distribution as F(x)=exp(−exp(−(x−μ)/σ)), where σ
is a scale parameter and μ is a location parameter. The probability a
parent chooses name k in year t, ℙkt, is given by the logit formula:
Pkt =
expðvkt = σÞ
∑j∈Ct expðvjt = σÞ
: ð2Þ
Because the number of births per year is large enough to use the
continuum as an approximation, the probability can be measured as
ℙkt=nkt /nt, where nkt is the number of name-k births in year t and nt
is total births in that year.
For the econometric speciﬁcation and welfare analysis, it is useful
to introduce a variable referred to in the literature as the inclusive
value or “log-sum term”:
Vt≡ ln ∑
j∈Ct
expðvjt = σÞ
" #
: ð3Þ
This notation and the continuum assumption allow us to express
name shares as
nkt = nt = Pkt = expðvkt = σ−VtÞ ð4Þ
Welfare of the representative parent is given by the expected value
of themaximumutility (Ukt(i) of the preferred choice). Using different
notation, Anderson et al. (1992, pp. 58–61) show that
E½max
k
fUktðiÞg = σVt + m; ð5Þ
where m≡E[ɛkt(i)]=σγ+μ is the mean of the parent-speciﬁc
idiosyncratic utility for a name.7 Given that we do not know σ, the
scale for utility, we cannot express welfare in meaningful units. Also,
without arbitrarily restricting m=0, we cannot even calculate
percentage changes in welfare. However, since σN0, we can infer
the sign of welfare changes induced by policy experiments from the
sign of changes in Vt. Moreover, we can compare the magnitudes of
welfare changes across experiments.
Taking logs of Eq. (4), the log share of children given name k is
given by
lnðnkt = ntÞ = vkt = σ−Vt : ð6Þ
The next step is to specify the determinants of vkt/σ, the
component of the utility of each name that derives from common
attributes of name k in year t. The speciﬁcation should be as simple as
possible—to facilitate interpretation and the simulation of counter-
factuals—but it should also capture the principal inﬂuences on naming
decisions.8 The common utility of a name is a function of three
Fig. 3. The rise of names originating in the TV show “Beverly Hills, 90210”.
6 These names were rising just after American-sounding “Kevin” became the
number one name in France. Although French people tend to view these names as
American, Dylan, Kelly, and Kevin are actually traditional Welsh and Irish names.
7 γ is Euler's number (≈0.577).
8 The discussion paper (Disdier et al., 2006) considers a wider set of determinants of
name choice, drawing hypotheses from Lieberson (2000). Here we focus on a more
parsimonious speciﬁcation that keeps the simulations manageable, while nevertheless
capturing the main results of interest.
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observables (discussed below) and unobserved name attractiveness
encompassing both ﬁxed (uk) and time-varying (ekt) components:
vkt = σ = f ðMkt ; Skt ;AktÞ + uk + ekt : ð7Þ
The ﬁrst two determinants of name attractiveness are media and
social “exposure” of the name in the current year. Media exposure,
Mkt, counts the number of instance in which name k appears on
widely released television shows, movies, and songs. Mkt comprises
counts of appearances of names in 180 major movies, 927 broadcast
TV shows, and 4845 popular songs. We consider the names of the
actors and roles for the top three roles in each show or movie. Song
exposures occur when a name appears as a word in a Top 100 song
title that year or as part of the performer's name.9 In our regressions
and simulations we distinguish foreign media exposures, denoted
Mkt
F , and performer exposures (names of actors and singers, as
opposed to names of characters), denotedMktP . To shorten expressions,
we suppress this distinction in this section.
Social exposure, Skt is an estimate of the number of living
individuals in France in year t who have name k. It is obtained by
cumulating births by name since 1900 and applying a death rate to
remove probabilistically the names of the deceased. Thus, social
exposure evolves according to the following stock-ﬂow formula: Skt=
(1−δkt)Sk,t−1+nk,t−1. The death rate, δkt, depends on the name and
year in order to allow for higher death rates for names that, on average,
pertain to older individuals. More detail on the construction of media
and social exposure variables is provided in the Data appendix.
Media and social exposures enter the utility function in much the
same way as Becker and Murphy (1993) model the inﬂuence of
advertising on product demand. That paper stipulates that advertise-
ments “give favorable notice” to other goods. Similarly, we viewmedia
and social exposure as enhancing attractiveness of a name. The most
straightforwardmechanism throughwhich this wouldworkwould be
a pure desire to imitate. The speciﬁcation can also be thought of as a
reduced form for more complex processes in which media and social
exposure raise awareness of names or associate them with desired
characteristics. As the focus of this paper is to estimate the impact of
media exposure, while controlling for social exposure, we will not
attempt to disentangle the mechanisms through which exposures
increase name attractiveness. Salganik et al. (2006) provide laboratory
evidence that individual choices of cultural goods are strongly
inﬂuenced by choices of strangers.10 Econometric evidence that social
exposure inﬂuences name choices can be found in Head and Mayer's
(2008) ﬁnding that geographically and socio-economically proximate
districts in France have greater similarity in naming patterns.
Social exposure tends to have a conservative inﬂuence on naming
patterns. If parents based naming decisions only on social exposures,
the distribution of names would tend to remain stable over time. This
is inconsistent with the rise of non-traditional names shown in Fig. 1
and the patterns described in Lieberson (2000), who views names as
examples of fashion-motivated behavior. The notion of fashion
involves a taste for things that are “current.” By selecting against
things that were popular in the past, parents signal that they are not
“old-fashioned.” We formalize this motive by assuming that parents
avoid names that are “dated,” i.e. statistically linked to age. We
therefore associate each name in year t with an estimated age, Akt.11
The age of a name is given by the difference between the current
year (t) and the weighted average birth year of people given that
name in the past (bkt), i.e. Akt= t−bkt. For example, the age associated
with the name Thierry in 1962 was 4 years (1962–1958). Forty years
later, the age of Thierry had risen to 37 (2002–1965). In the same year
“Neo” is an example of a “young” name (A=1.1).12
In addition to the independent effects of exposure and age, we
estimate speciﬁcations that include interaction terms between these
variables. These interactions allow for selective imitation in which
individuals are more likely to imitate current (and therefore
fashionable) names than dated names. In particular, we expect the
marginal effect of media and stock exposures to be decreasing in
name age. This hypothesis is analogous to an effect observed in the
literature on advertising effects on sales: advertising elasticities are
higher for new brands and “decrease during the product life cycle.”13
We can now specify f(Mkt, Skt, Akt) so as to obtain an estimable
regression equation.
f ðMkt ; Skt ;AktÞ = β1 ln ð1 + MktÞ + β2 lnð1 + SktÞ + β3 lnð1 + AktÞ
+ β4 lnð1 + MktÞ × lnð1 + AktÞ + β5 lnð1 + SktÞ
× lnð1 + AktÞ: ð8Þ
The ﬁrst row comprises the direct effects of media and social
exposures and name age. The “log of one plus” functional form was
selected because each of these variables are right-skewed (logs) and
frequently take on zeros (one plus). The next rows contain the
interaction terms motivated by our hypothesis that the impacts of
media and social exposures are decreasing in the age of the name (we
predict β4b0, β5b0).
During the 1967–1992 period, naming regulations continued to
favor a subset of names considered traditional. Given the decline in
usage of Saint names observed since the 1960s, it is not clear whether
the old rules were being consistently enforced. Nevertheless, we allow
for lingering effects of the French naming rules by including an
indicator for Saint names. Substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (7) and the
result into Eq. (6) and including the rules indicators, we obtain
ln ðnkt = ntÞ = β1 lnð1 + MktÞ + β2 lnð1 + SktÞ + β3 lnð1 + AktÞ
+ β4 lnð1 + MktÞ × lnð1 + AktÞ + β5 lnð1 + SktÞ
× lnð1 + AktÞ + β6Saintk−Vt + uk + ekt
ð9Þ
The last three terms in the third row are treated as year effects
(−Vt), name ﬁxed effects (uk), and an error term (ekt). Regression
standard errors are clustered at the name level tomake them robust to
correlations between ekt and ekt′ for name k. By using year dummies,
we do not impose any relationship between our estimates of Vt and
the underlying determinants contained in the log sum of exp(vkt/σ)
shown in Eq. (2). There are two reasons why we do not use a non-
linear least squares approach to constrain the Vt term to depend on
the vector of βs. First, to estimate a ﬁxed effects model with 18,947
name ﬁxed effects, uk, we need to use the within transformation.
This requires us to keep the speciﬁcation linear in the parameters.
Second, vkt/σ depends on the unobserved attributes of names
captured in uk+ekt. Non-linear least squares estimation of Eq. (9)
would not incorporate the unobserved name attributes in the −Vt.
4. Regression results
This section reports estimates of the parameters of Eq. (9) for two
different sets of names. The ﬁrst sample comprises all of the names
given in France to three or more children in a given year. While this
set is the most complete possible given the data, it has the
9 In the discussion paper, Disdier et al. (2006) we estimated different effects for
movies, shows, and songs but did not ﬁnd systematically important differences.
10 They study decisions to download songs of unknown bands after listening to
samples and observing downloading behavior of other participants.
11 Carter (2004) reports that a consumer marketing company calculates the likely
age of a person with a given name using a system it calls “Monica.” They use the age
classiﬁcation for direct marketing purposes since ﬁrst name information is often
available when true age is not. While their algorithm is not publicly available, the
description in the article makes it look similar to the approach described below.
12 It ﬁrst appeared as a name in France in 2000, the year after the release of the movie
The Matrix, featuring a protagonist with that name.
13 See Vakratsas and Ambler's (1999) survey for references.
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disadvantage of the sample being determined endogenously by the
choices made by parents in a given year. To investigate the potential
effects of selection bias on the results, we also estimate the model
using an exogenous set of names: the contemporaneous 1000 most
popular names in the United States. With this choice set, we are able
to take into account names given to fewer than three children using
Tobit estimation.
All reported speciﬁcations use a pooled sample of male and female
names. Thus, the βs we estimate should be seen as averages of the two
sexes. The rationale for this is that the sex-speciﬁc estimates did not
differ from each other in ways that were interesting and therefore did
not warrant the additional reporting space. The theory dictates that
the Vt be sex-speciﬁc (since log-sum term capturing all the
alternatives differs for boys and girls) so we estimate the models
with interacted sex–year dummies.
4.1. Sample of all non-rare names in France
We estimate the name choice model for two time periods: 1967–
2002 and 1993–2002. Names given prior to 1967 were subject to
closer regulation and thus may have diverged from the unconstrained
maximization assumed in ourmodel. After 1992, name choices appear
to be essentially unregulated. Using the information from 1967–1992
has the potential to help estimate the model more precisely but we
want to make sure it does not give results that are inconsistent with
the ﬁnal period that is clearly unconstrained by regulation.
Tables 1 and 2 show the results in six different speciﬁcations. In
each table, we start with the simplest model in which name
popularity only depends on media exposure (and the unreported
sex–year dummies included in all our regressions). Speciﬁcations (2)–
(6) distinguish between foreign and domestic-sourcemedia as well as
between the names of performers (actors, singers) and characters
(roles in TV and movies, people named in song titles). Column (3)
adds the indicator for whether name k is a Saint name (a proxy for
compliance with tradition). Column (4) adds the impact of social
exposure (stocks) and fashion (age of a name). Column (5) introduces
name-level ﬁxed effects, while column (6) adds the interaction terms
intended to capture the selective imitation behavior.
Column (1) shows that the correlation between media exposure
and name use is not just a matter of anecdotes and data-mining.
Names that are currently exposed on media are systematically more
popular than other names. To express the impact of media in a way
that is comparable across speciﬁcations, all tables report the Media
Multiplier (MM) corresponding to the coefﬁcients in that column. The
MM is deﬁned as the ratio of the name probability with a single media
exposure over the probability with no exposures. Thus for column (1),
it is exp(2.362×ln(1+1))=5.14, suggesting that the ﬁrst media
exposure raises name use by a factor of ﬁve. The corresponding
estimate for the 1993–2002 sample predicts a smaller, but still
massive, four-fold increase.
Column (2) distinguishes foreign and performer media exposures.
It reveals that names appearing on foreign media are prima facie less
inﬂuential than those appearing on domestic media. This naive
speciﬁcation does not include any controls. What this result means in
this speciﬁcation is probably that the endogeneity problem raised
above is much less severe for foreign media. Script-writers outside
France do not choose names for their characters so as to conﬁrm to
current tastes in French naming patterns. This interpretation is
reinforced by the results on media exposure of persons as opposed to
characters. The latter's names are much more likely to be chosen
precisely to match parent's tastes than are the names of performers,
and indeed the effect of media exposure is lower for person names.
For this speciﬁcation and all others that distinguish between types of
media exposure, we calculate theMM for foreign performers, sincewe
have argued that these exposures are less likely to be inﬂuenced by
endogenous media names and are therefore closer to a causal effect.
Column (3) shows that a small part of the association between name
popularity and media exposure arises because both draw from a
common set of traditional names. Once taking into account the
positive effect of Saint names, media exposure has a lower inﬂuence.
Column (4) shows a much more important drop in estimated media
effects after accounting for social exposure and fashion motives
(name stocks and age). The multiplier falls to about 1.3 in both
samples. Column (5) completes the set of controls by taking into
Table 1
Media effects on name shares: 1967–2002 sample.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with a, b and c respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=14.8 (sample mean).
Table 2
Media effects on name shares: 1993–2002 sample.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with
a
,
b
and
c
respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F
=Mkt
P
=1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F
=Mkt
P
=0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=15.6 (sample mean).
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account unobserved characteristics of a name through the inclusion of
name–sex ﬁxed effects. The media multipliers shrink to 1.07 in both
samples and media signiﬁcance levels become marginal. By contrast,
social exposure and fashion motives retain a very high level of
signiﬁcance in column (5). For the 1967–2002 sample, a 10% increase
in the age of a name translates into an 8.5% fall in popularity.
Column (6) allows for selective imitation, and reveals that the
effects of media and social exposures are highly dependent on the age
of the name being exposed. A namewith the 1967–2002 samplemean
age (14.8 years) has a Media Multiplier of exp[(0.741−0.005−0.041
−0.201ln[1+14.8])ln(1+1)]=1.102. That is, a single foreign per-
former average-age exposure boosts name popularity by 10%. The impact
of new name (Akt=0) is considerably larger: 62%. On the other hand,
there is no media stimulus for a 31-year old foreign performer name
(exp[(0.741−0.004−0.041) /0.201]−1=31). The corresponding
calculations for the 1993–2002 sample give an average-age multiplier
of 1.076 and threshold age of 38. Social exposure exhibits a similar
pattern, with positive effects disappearing for names aged exp(0.808/
0.201)−1=55 years in the long sample, and exp(0.491/0.149)
−1=26 years in the short one. Therefore, both kinds of exposure
are strongly affected by fashion, with exposure of “middle-aged”
names having small or even negative impacts on popularity.
The preferred speciﬁcations of Tables 1 and 2 suggest that media
exposure has an effect on tastes that is similar to social exposure in
terms of magnitude and sensitivity to fashion. With the full set of
controls and the age interactions, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that all media exposures have the same impact, regardless of whether
they are domestic or foreign, performer or character. This gives us
some conﬁdence that our controls have purged the media counts of
the endogeneity that was so visible in speciﬁcations (2) and (3). The
media effects for the average-aged name are not notably lower (8%
versus 10%) in the recent sample, which is consistent with the view
that name choice was not strongly constrained in the 1967–1993
period.
4.2. Sample of top 1000 names in the US
The sample we have used in the estimations above was selected
based on a minimum threshold of popularity. It comprises all names
given in France—as long as the name was given more than twice in
that year. This is the most comprehensive data available, including
around ﬁve thousand names for each sex per year. However there are
thousands of other possible names (especially when one considers
possible alternate spellings) that were not used at all or were given to
just one or two babies. For example, the name “Arwen” was rare (or
non-existent) in France prior to 2002. The estimations in the previous
subsection do not take into account that the name transitioned from
rare to non-rare the year after the movie Fellowship of the Ring was
released (featuring a character named Arwen). Similarly, the
estimation is not inﬂuenced by names like “Chuck” that appeared
repeatedly in media (Berry, the 1950s singer) but were never non-
rare in France.
It seems worthwhile to pursue an alternate sample selection
procedure that is not predicated on the use of the name in France. In
light of our interest in media as a mode of international transmission
of cultural traits, we use a sample based on popularity in the United
States. This provides a natural way to relate our empirical method to
the public policy concern over “invasion” of national culture by
American cultural traits, transmitted by what is widely perceived as
the world's dominant media industry.
In each year, the sample comprises the 2000 names in the top 1000
for boys and girls in United States.14 Prior to 1990, the top 1000
rankings in the US were constructed on a decadal basis. Hence, for the
1967–2002 estimation period, the set of names remains constant
within each decade. For the 1993–2002 estimation period, we use
annual top 1000 rankings from the US to determine the set of names.
The data depicted in Fig. 1 reveal that 36–49% of all French babies
were given names in the US top 1000 during the 1967–2002 period.
Using this sample frame, Brandon is included in every year because, in
the US, Brandon has been a top-1000 boy's name since the 1950s. In
the national sample, Brandon only entered the sample in 1986, the
ﬁrst year in which three or more Brandons appear in France. In
contrast, Arwen is excluded from this sample in every year—even in
2002, the year it was actually non-rare in France—because Arwen
never attained a top-1000 ranking in the US.
Our regression speciﬁcations follow the same sequence as in
Table 1, but now take into account the fact that many of the most
popular names in the US were not chosen at all by French parents.
More precisely, when we do not observe the name k in the set of non-
rare names, it means that this name has been chosen two or fewer
times in year t. For any name that is rare (nkt≤2) in France, we recode
nkt=2 and estimate using Tobit to account for censoring. Just over
56% of the observations in this speciﬁcation are censored in the long
sample but censoring falls to 48% in the 1993–2002 sample. Tobit
methodswere not feasible in the previous sample design since we had
noway of selecting a ﬁnite set of censored names. Note that we change
our dependent variable to the log number of births (ln nkt) in these
speciﬁcations, instead of shares (ln nkt/nt), since the statistical censoring
occurs on births rather than shares. We maintain consistency with our
theoretical framework by having sex–year dummies on the right-hand-
side of the equation, which now account for ln nt−Vt, the total number
of births for each year and sex and the inclusive value. Another
modiﬁcation to the prior econometric speciﬁcation is that we have to
incorporate the unobserved name effects, uk, as random effects in
columns (5) and (6) of the Tobit speciﬁcations.15
A comparison of columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 seems to tell the
same story as in Table 1, even though the multiplier of media
appearance is much larger with this estimation method.16 The naive
estimations yield very large media effects, with lower impacts for
exposure of foreign media and performers. Interestingly, adding
controls lowers the media effect drastically to bring them in line with
the ones obtained using linear regressions on the French name sample
in Table 1. The ﬁnal column reveals a surprisingly similar estimate of
the media multiplier (for a single foreign character of average age) of
1.105, against 1.102 in Table 1. An important difference is the cutoff
age when media exposure ceases to have a positive effect, which is
now almost 400 years, implying that media impacts are positive for
the whole sample range of ages. This result pertains only to the 1967–
2002 sample where the estimated interaction term is very small in
absolute value. For the 1993–2002period, Table 9 in Appendix A reveals
a cutoff point of exp[(0.384−0.041−0.006)/0.088]−1=45 years,
which is remarkably close to the 38 years obtained for the full set of
names in the 1993–2002 sample.
The US name sample allows us to introduce a new control variable,
the contemporaneous popularity of each name in the US. Table 4 adds
the log of nktUS, the number of babies given name k in the US in year t,
14 See Data appendix for details on sources.
15 Tobit does not allow for the within transformation needed to estimate large
numbers of ﬁxed effects.
16 For the top-1000 US name set, we report only Tobit results for the 1967–2002
period. Tables in the appendix show additional results. There we ﬁrst show the 1993–
2002 period, but using just the US names that were non-rare in France, and thus not
taking account censoring with Tobit. This allows comparison with Table 2 to see the
impact of name universe change holding the regression method unchanged. The main
results are quite similar, passing the same signiﬁcance thresholds. In our preferred
regression, column (6), the coefﬁcient on ln (1+Mkt) goes from 0.400 to 0.321, and
the media-age interaction changes from −0.125 to −0.090. Table 9 then changes
estimation to be Tobit and Table 10 adds the popularity in the US as a control. Results
diverge very little from the corresponding Tables for 1967–2002 shown in the text. A
notable consequence of using Tobit is that the media multiplier becomes much larger—
until the controls are introduced.
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as a control to the same set of speciﬁcations estimated in Table 3. It is
tempting to interpret the coefﬁcient on this variable as measuring the
strength of social transmission of names from the US to France. This
might arise via tourism or study abroad. However, it is important to
recognize that our study omits some media (e.g. news and sports
programs, books) and it measures the included media with error.
Hence, the estimated effect of US popularity may actually capture
omitted components of media exposure. Furthermore, popularity of
names in both countries may be determined by common inﬂuences.
We see some evidence of this last effect in column (4) where the
inclusion of the stock and age of a name knocks the estimated
elasticity of US popularity down from near unity in columns (1) to (3)
to just 0.112. In the full speciﬁcation, column (6), the partial
correlation between US and French name popularity falls to 0.03.
Controlling for US popularity in this speciﬁcation hardly changes the
Media Multiplier (1.107 vs 1.105).
The bottom line from the US sample is reassuring: the preferred
speciﬁcation upholds the ﬁnding that a single foreign performer
exposure boosts name popularity by about 10%. Moreover, the ﬁnding
of selective imitation whereby media and social exposure have less
positive effects as names become “older” seems very robust.
5. Policy experiment: foreign media exclusion
Theparameterswehaveestimated canbepluggedback into the logit
choice probabilities to determine the share of each name for any setting
of the right-hand-side variables. This allows us to conduct counterfac-
tual exercises in which we manipulate the amount of media exposure.
Such a policy change is also realistic: In 1986 the French government
introduced quotas for audio-visual services. French law now requires
that 60% of themovies and shows on TV be of European origin. Of those,
40% of free-channel programming should be in French. In addition, the
law imposes compulsory investment in the production of European and
French-language content.With respect to radio, at least 40%of the songs
played should be in French.17
Within the context of this study we cannot know what names
would have been exposed on French media in the absence of the
quota system. We consider a counterfactual move in the opposite
direction: the complete removal of foreign media and therefore of all
name exposure on foreign-origin movies and shows and foreign-
language songs. This experiment is analogous to the autarky policy
often studied in the context of trade in goods.
The removal of foreign media has two types of effects in the
context of our model. There is a static effect of lowering attractiveness
of names that would have been exposed on foreign media and,
correspondingly, raising the attractiveness of other names. There is
also a dynamic effect because the change in a name's popularity
(ﬂows) in year t can affect the stocks and age of names in all sub-
sequent years. The simulation therefore enables rich dynamics: When
a young name is exposed in the media, it has an immediate boost in
popularity, which may be reinforced over time, because the initial
surge raises the stock of people exposing that name socially and
lowers the age associated with it, both having positive effects on the
desire to adopt this name for one's child.
Our simulation method proceeds as follows.
Step 0: Estimate the coefﬁcients (β), ﬁxed effects (uk) and residuals
(ekt) used in the calculation of name shares using sex-speciﬁc
versions of the preferred speciﬁcation (column 6 in Table 1).
Weparameterize the simulationswith the following estimates:
Females:
f ð⋯Þ = 0:82 ln ð1 + MktÞ + 0:01 lnð1 + MFktÞ−0:14 lnð1 + MPktÞ
+ 0:83 lnð1 + SktÞ−0:50 lnð1 + AktÞ−0:21 lnð1 + MktÞ
× lnð1 + AktÞ−0:21 lnð1 + SktÞ × lnð1 + AktÞ:
ð10Þ
Table 3
Media effects on French use of popular American names: 1967–2002 sample.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with a, b and c respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=12.5 (sample mean).
Table 4
Media and non-media effects on French use of popular American names: 1967–2002.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with
a
,
b
and
c
respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F
=Mkt
P
=1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F
=Mkt
P
=0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=12.5 (sample mean).
17 See http://www.csa.fr/infos/controle/controle_intro.php for more detail on the
French quota system. Other countries employ similar quota systems. Canadian content
rules require that 60% of broadcast TV programming and 35% of broadcast radio be of
Canadian origin. South Korea required movie theaters to show locally-produced ﬁrms
at least 40% of the year—until the signing of the Korea–US FTA, which lowered the
requirement to 20%.
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Males:
f ð⋯Þ = 0:69 ln ð1 + MktÞ−0:01 lnð1 + MFktÞ + 0:04 lnð1 + MPktÞ
+ 0:78 lnð1 + SktÞ−0:50 lnð1 + AktÞ−0:20 lnð1 + MktÞ
× lnð1 + AktÞ−0:19 lnð1 + SktÞ × lnð1 + AktÞ: ð11Þ
Step 1: In the ﬁrst year (t=1 corresponding to 1967 or 1993) of the
simulation, we set age and stocks at their actual levels, Ak1
and Sk1. We then determine counterfactual name attractive-
ness, ṽk1/σ= f(M̃j1F =0, Sj1, Aj1)+ûj+êj1. This sets the foreign
media appearance counts, Mk1F , to zero and also subtracts
foreign media counts from all media, Mk1, and media
performers, Mk1P . The counterfactuals assume that the same
ﬁxed effects, ûk, and residuals êkt apply in the absence of
foreign media. Calculate the log-sum term, Ṽ1, using Eq. (3).
Calculate the counterfactual name shares nkt/nt= ℙ̃k1 using
the logit formula, Eq. (4). In ℙ̃k1, not only the numerator is
affected by the zeroing of foreignmedia. Because the inclusive
value, Ṽ1, changes in the simulation, the number of predicted
births in the counterfactual changes even for names that did
not receive media exposure. When foreign media are excluded,
our simulations show that ṼtbVt. This increases the share of
children given names that did not receive media exposure in
the baseline. Taking total births as given, we calculate the
ﬂows for each name as ñk1= ℙ̃k1n1.
Step 2: The ﬁrst variable to be adjusted in the simulation based on the
counterfactual ﬂow (ñk1) is the age of a name in year 2.
Counterfactual birth years are calculated recursively as
b˜k;t + 1 = tðn˜k;t = N˜k;t + 1Þ + b˜k;tðN˜k;t = N˜k;t + 1Þ;
where N is our notation for (un-depreciated) cumulative births,
Ñk,t=Ñk,t−1+ñk,t−1, and b̃k,1=bk,1 for the initial year of the
simulation (1967 or 1993). Subtracting from the current year, t
+1, we obtain age for each name as Ãkt= t− b̃kt.
Step 3: The counterfactual age calculation for each name and year
implies a different set of death rates. The new death rates are
given by δ̃kt=d(Ãkt) (see Appendix A). Counterfactual social
exposures are obtained by adding on the simulated births,
ñkt, to the depreciated stock of each name: S̃k,t+1=(1− δ̃kt)
S̃k,t+ñk,t, where S̃k1=Sk1.
Step 4: Calculate (using the formulas above) the next year values of
ṽk,t+1/σ= f(M̃ktF =0, S̃k,t+1, Ãk,t+1)+ûk+êk,t+1, Ṽt+1, ℙ̃k,t+1,
and ñk,t+1.
Step 5: Repeat steps 1–4 year-by-year until 2002.
We refer to the procedure including steps 1 to 4 as the dynamic
version of the simulation. We also conduct a static version of the
simulation for comparison purposes. In that case we skip steps 2
and 3. Step 4 in the static simulation calculates ṽk,t+1/σ= f(M̃ktF =0,
Sk,t+1, Ak,t+1)+ûk+êk,t+1. Thus, the static version leaves stocks and
age unaffected by the policy changes.
We use twomeasures to quantify the aggregate effects of media on
French parents. The “positive” measure is a calculation of the share of
parents in a given year who changed the name of their baby because
of media exposure. Deﬁne a “stayer” as a child that retains the same
name under the baseline and the counterfactual. We calculate this as
the lesser of NkT and ÑkT, where NkT and ÑkT are the cumulated name-
k births in the baseline and simulation up until year T (2002) and
NT=∑kNkT. The change share is therefore given by
%renamed = 1−∑k minfNkT ; N˜kTg
NT
:
The normative measure is the change in expected utility implied
by our counterfactual removal of media exposure. For ease of
interpretation we express this as the gain (or loss if negative) in
expected utility attributable to media exposure. Eq. (5) implies that
the media-induced change in expected utility in a given year is given
by σ(Vt−Ṽt). Consequently, we measure the total welfare change due
to media by accumulating the differences in the inclusive values over
all periods included in the simulation:
Δwelfare = ∑
t
ðVt− V˜ tÞ:
Although we cannot interpret the units of this measure (because σ is
unknown), it does indicate the signof thewelfare changeand theunits are
comparable across policy experiments for a given gender (σ may differ
across sexes).
Table 5 provides the simulated percentage of babies renamed
when removing foreign media in the static and dynamic versions of
our simulations. Over the 1967–2002 period, about 28 million babies
were born in France. Our dynamic simulation predicts that, among
those, over amillion (386,131 girls and 656,422 boys) would have had
a different name without the inﬂuence of foreign media. This
represents 2.89% of baby girls and 4.61% of baby boys. Table 11 in
Appendix B presents results when running the same simulations on
the 1993–2002 period. The corresponding percentages of babies
renamed are 1.68% and 2.36%, reﬂecting a shorter period over which
the dynamic part of the model can produce its effects.
The last column of Table 5 shows the change in welfare (Vt−Ṽt) that
the simulations attribute to foreign media. To the extent that media
exposure raises the name-level terms in V, i.e. the vkt, it will tend to raise
welfare. The coefﬁcients reported in Eqs. (10) and (11) show that media
exposure raisesvkt so longas the ageof name,Akt, is belowa critical value—
49 years for girls and 31 years for men.18 Since almost 90% of the foreign-
exposed female name–years and over 75% of the male name–years are
younger than the critical values, media is mainly enhancing name
attractiveness rather than detracting from it. Parents of male children
obtain higher welfare beneﬁts despite the lower critical value and this
appears to be the result of a higher rate of exposure: 5.9% of the male
name–year combinations had positive foreign media exposure whereas
only 2.7% of the female name–years did. Onepuzzling aspect of the results
is that the dynamic welfare gains from media are smaller than the static
gains, even though the dynamics lead to more name changes. The
explanation seems tobe thatmedia exposure for a small set of nameswith
relatively large stocks lowered the attractiveness of a larger number of
unexposed names that on average had relatively small stocks and young
ages. The adjustment in stocks and ages that resulted lowered the
subsequent attractiveness of those names, partially offsetting some of the
welfare beneﬁts from media.
For the sake of comparison, we also run the simulations for the
unlikely policy experiment where all media would be shut down. The
dynamic effects entail names changes for 4.45% of girls and 6.9% of
boys. In this case, almost 1.6 million babies would be renamed. The
higher magnitudes were to be expected since many French names
appear only on domestic media. In the average year, 4.3% of female
names and 9.3% of male names received media exposure. This
probably explains why removing all media would have lowered
welfare more than just removing foreign media.
Our ﬁrst measure of the global impact of foreign media exposure
on cultural patterns gives ﬁgures ranging between 1 and 5%. Although
not negligible, the overall effects are small, even when allowing for
36 years of dynamic media effects through changes in the stocks and
ages of names. However, for some names the effects revealed by our
simulations are really large. We focus here on one speciﬁc case: the
18 The calculations for these critical values are exp(0.82/0.21)−1 and exp(0.69/0.2)−1,
respectively. For media exposure of performers, the ﬁgures are exp(0.68/0.21)
−1=24 years for girls and exp(0.73/0.2)−1=37 years for boys.
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removal of all foreignmedia exposure, accounting for dynamic effects,
in Table 6. This table lists the 20 names that the simulations assign the
greatest positive impact of media exposure. Out of those 20 names, 13
appear to have their popularity more than double. Most of those
names sound like typical examples of the “foreign cultural invasion”
claims. They are not traditional French names (Britney and Jason have
a respective age of 2 and 8 years in 2002), sound American to French
ears, and have been heavily media-exposed.
The other side of the spectrum is also revealing: the names that
actually suffer from foreign media exposure. Table 7 shows that some of
themost harmed names have very lowmedia exposurewhile others are
heavily exposed. The highly exposed names that are harmed by media
seem to share a common feature—their names convey age. For male
names over 31 and female names over 49, our estimates indicate that
media exposurehas a negative impacton attractiveness. This can explain
why names like Paul and Charles—with average ages of 56 and 57 in the
1967–2002 sample—are harmed by foreign media. We expect names
that were rarely or never exposed to experience declines in popularity
due to heavy media exposure for other names. Thus, it is not surprising
that names like Margot, Hugo, Sebastien, and Elodie would have done
better in the absence of foreignmedia. The question is why those names
lose somuch from the existence ofmedia,while others that received the
same low amount of exposure suffer much less. In other words, what
accounts for the unequal distribution of dynamics losses? This inequality
does not arise in the static simulation where we ﬁnd that the losses for
unexposed names range from two to four percent.
We investigated the reasons why foreign media harmed some
unexposed names much more than others. Consider the starting year of
the simulation, 1967, where we shut down foreign media. Letℓ denote a
representative name that did not receive any foreign media exposure
during the simulation. The popularity of name ℓ in the counterfactual,
ℙ̃ℓ,1967, rises due to a decline in the attractiveness of media-exposed
names, captured by a decrease in the inclusive value: Ṽ1967bV1967. In the
static version of our simulation, the effect of media removal on the
unexposed names remains conﬁned to the change caused by the fall in V
each period. For the dynamic case, however, the initial boost is self-
reinforcing: The counterfactual stock of name ℓ rises relative to the
baseline in the following year because ℙ̃ℓ,1967Nℙℓ,1967. The rise in stock
further enhances the popularity of name ℓ.19
Names with a high initial popularity in 1967 experience the same
percentage increase as the others, but a higher absolute increase in
the number of babies born with that name in 1967, which translates
into a higher absolute stock increase in 1968. Since stocks enter
positively in utility, this will feed into a larger rise in popularity in
1968, with the resulting percent increase in ℙ ̃ℓ,1968 being all the
higher if the stock in 1968 was initially low. To summarize,
unexposed names have a big response to the shutting down of
media if they have a high ﬂow-to-stock ratio, that is if they
experience a popularity boom over the simulation period. This is
the case for Sebastien, which starts as the 89thmost popular name in
1967 to reach number 1 from 1975 to 1979.20 As a contrasting case,
Table 5
Simulated effects of media on renamings and welfare, 1967–2002.
Sex Media Dynamics # renamed % renamed Δ welfare
Females Foreign No 150,634 1.13 0.51
Yes 386,131 2.89 0.27
All No 242,501 1.81 0.88
Yes 595,513 4.45 0.50
Males Foreign No 262,906 1.84 0.77
Yes 656,422 4.61 0.45
All No 375,224 2.63 1.28
Yes 982,895 6.90 0.68
Table 6
Names most helped by foreign media, 1967–2002.
Name Male Years
non-rare
Years
exposed
Simulated #
births
Actual #
births
(On−Off) /
Off
Media off Media on
Tia 0 4 4 32 105 224.41
Laura 0 36 17 44,100 117,913 167.37
Lisa 0 36 23 13,206 34,098 158.21
Tom 1 35 30 9594 23,881 148.92
Jennifer 0 36 28 25,721 63,831 148.17
David 1 36 35 116,501 287,812 147.05
Jonathan 1 36 20 40,278 98,436 144.39
Michael 1 36 35 36,247 85,245 135.18
Britney 0 4 3 59 136 132.21
Theo 1 36 16 24,707 54,213 119.43
Shakira 0 1 1 23 49 114.21
Xena 0 6 5 29 61 110.6
Calista 0 4 4 140 292 107.96
Shannen 0 10 10 72 141 96.87
Tasha 0 3 3 5 10 91.83
Alan 1 36 30 7217 13,620 88.73
Jason 1 34 23 8121 15,314 88.57
Rowan 1 10 10 72 135 86.71
Anastacia 0 3 3 11 20 86.66
Anthony 1 36 25 85,452 157,938 84.83
Note: Actual and simulated # births are cumulated between 1967 and 2002. The
number of births has been rounded to the nearest unit, while the (On−Off) /Off
percentage is calculated before the rounding. “Years exposed” counts the number of
years that the name was non-rare and appeared on media.
Table 7
Names most harmed by foreign media, 1967–2002.
Name Male Years
non-rare
Years
exposed
Simulated #
births
Actual #
births
(On−Off) /
Off
Media off Media on
Lara 0 36 9 5863 4436 −24.34
Paul 1 36 34 77,286 60,771 −21.37
Arthur 1 36 24 47,887 38,102 −20.43
Anais 0 36 1 105,454 87,381 −17.14
Valentin 1 36 0 79,677 66,341 −16.74
Sebastien 1 36 2 353,398 294,439 −16.68
Romain 1 36 3 181,912 155,590 −14.47
Enzo 1 35 7 28,234 24,186 −14.34
Corentin 1 35 0 42,580 36,726 −13.75
Hugo 1 36 1 70,404 60,759 −13.7
Charles 1 36 33 43,184 37,304 −13.62
Guillaume 1 36 6 224,498 194,493 −13.37
Andrea 0 36 12 17,207 14,920 −13.29
Eva 0 36 20 34,753 30,222 −13.04
Manon 0 36 3 106,110 92,527 −12.8
Celeste 0 36 14 1519 1328 −12.57
Margot 0 32 0 23,504 20,592 −12.39
Lucas 1 36 23 79,265 69,584 −12.21
Elodie 0 36 1 172,341 151,465 −12.11
Julie 0 36 30 188,168 166,214 −11.67
Note: Actual and simulated # births are cumulated between 1967 and 2002. The
number of births has been rounded to the nearest unit, while the (On−Off) /Off
percentage is calculated before the rounding. “Years exposed” counts the number of
years that the name was non-rare and appeared on media.
19 The age of name ℓ is also adjusted and the effect goes in the same direction: As
name ℓ becomes a little younger its future popularity rises. For brevity, we focus our
explanation on changes in stocks.
20 Other examples include Hugo, which rises from rank 409 in 1967 to rank 97 in
1987 and ranks fourth in 2002 and Elodie, which starts at rank 298 in 1967 and
reaches rank 1 from 1988 to 1990.
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take Gustave, which has only 16 babies born in 1967, with rank 591,
but stays in this range for the whole period, never rising above rank
504. The negative effect of foreign media on Gustave is only−0.98%,
while it is −16.68% for Sebastien.
In a ﬁnal simulation, we remove all media exposure, rather than
only the foreign media. While this scenario is unlikely to ever be a real
policy experiment, it is nonetheless interesting to see if the list of
names most helped and most harmed by media changes a lot or not.
The names shown in Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix B overlaps
considerably with those shown in Tables 6 and 7. Foreign media is
therefore an important component of the overall effect of media, at
least for the extreme gainers and losers. Note also that the names like
Laura or David which are frequently used on both French and foreign
media, would be considerably more harmed by total media removal
simulation (all media generated a 252% gain for Laura while foreign
media contributed just 167%), as expected.
6. Conclusion
We investigate whether exposure to media in general and foreign-
originmedia in particular affect naming patterns in France. The names
chosen for babies are emblematic characteristics of national cultural
traditions. Changes in practices on this subject have been interpreted
as one manifestation of globalization, possibly endangering cultural
diversity. France has been at the forefront of political activity, arguing
for a cultural exception that would allow for government intervention
to protect domestic culture. The political discussion of protecting
culture tends to obscure whether it is the consumer or the producer
that requires protection. If it is the producer, then the old arguments
of trade policy imply that it is more efﬁcient to promote domestic
production via subsidies than to inhibit import consumption via trade
barriers. However, if import consumption has adverse external effects,
the case for limiting foreign access could make more sense.
In this paper we offer what we believe to be the ﬁrst systematic
evidence of the impact of foreign media on a cultural trait. Our results
show that foreign media have a positive, but complex, inﬂuence on
naming patterns in France. Our “naive” regression analysis ﬁnds very
big effects of media exposure on a name's popularity, thus seeming to
corroborate anecdotal accounts of media inﬂuence. The introduction
of controls for attributes that currently lend popularity to a name
dramatically lowers the estimated media effect. Our preferred
speciﬁcation maintains those controls and allows for selective
imitation of names that appear on media: parents adopt media
names only if they are sufﬁciently fashionable, i.e. “young.” When a
brand new name appears on media, its popularity jumps by 62%
compared to an unexposed new name. The effect of media falls to 10%
for a name with the mean age in the sample and becomes negative for
ages over 31.
Our model of name choice allows for counterfactual analysis,
which we use to quantify the total positive and normative effects of
media on naming patterns in France. The simulations also identify the
names that were most helped and most harmed. We ﬁnd that foreign
media changed less than ﬁve percent of names. The broader
implication from this speciﬁc result is that reports of the death of
local cultural diversity may be exaggerated. Although the aggregate
impact appears modest, we ﬁnd many examples of non-traditional
names for which our simulation attributes recent surges in popularity
to foreign media. Perhaps these cases explain the strength of the
public concern over cultural invasion channeled through foreign
media.
Even if we had found stronger overall foreign media effects, it
would not have provided a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for barriers to trade
in audio-visual services. Just as we normally presume that imports of
goods beneﬁt the consumer, parents may beneﬁt from choosing
media-exposed names. Our simulations point to welfare gains from
both domestic and foreign media. This is because the attractiveness of
the most exposed names is estimated to be enhanced by media
exposure, leading to a higher expected utility for the name actually
chosen. Because we take the choice set as exogenous, our simulations
do not capture welfare gains from the introduction of new names to
France. Since the logit model builds in a love of variety, it seems likely
that endogenizing the choice set would lead to larger welfare
increases from foreign media.
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Appendix A. Data appendix
Appendix A.1. French names
The French statistical agency, INSEE, sells a CD-ROM called the
Fichier des Prénoms that provides national data based on ﬁlings of
birth certiﬁcates at the Civil Registry. The database includes all babies
born in all of France (including the overseas departments Reunion,
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana). This gives us our key variable
nkt, the number of births of name k in year t. Particular names are
shown if they were given to at least three babies for a given sex and
year, i.e. nkt is not observed for nkt≤2. The total number of births with
names given to just one or two babies are summed and reported
under the name “rare.” We use nkt to calculate ℙkt=nkt/nt, the
proportion of babies given name k in year t. We also use this variable
to estimate the age of name based on the distribution of name
frequencies observed up until time t:
Akt = t−bkt = t− ∑
t−1
τ=0
τnkτ
∑t−1j = 0nkj
:
Using data on the age distribution of the French population from
1900 to 1998, we calculate the average death rate as function of age.21
Let S(a)t denote the population aged a in year t. Then the death rate
for age a individuals in year t is (S(a)t−1−S(a+1)t)/S(a)t−1. For
each age from 0 to 99 years, we average over all the annual death rates
from 1967 (the ﬁrst year in our estimation) to 1998 (the last year for
whichwe have the age distribution of the population) to obtain a non-
parametric relationship between the death rate and age, d(a). We
then combine information on the average age of a name, Akt with the
age-speciﬁc death rate to estimate the stock of individuals with name
k in year t, denoted Skt. The formula applied is
Skt = ½1−dðAktÞSk;t−1 + nk;t−1:
Weused thewebsite nominis.cef.fr to obtain a list of Saints recognized
with “fêtes” in France. It uses the typical French spelling (e.g. Jean, not
John). Of the 2664 listed Saints, 1101 are directmatches for namesused in
our data set and1563 are names of Saints thatwere never usedmore than
twice in France. We added compound names to the Saint list even if they
werenot thenamesof actual Saints if bothelements are Saintnames (as in
Jean-Claude). This adds 910 additional names, giving 2011 Saint names in
21 Those data are available on the website of the French national institute for
demographic studies (INED) http://www.ined.fr/cdrom_vallin_mesle/Donnees-de-
base/Donnees-de-base.htm and are based on the work by Meslé and Vallin (2002).
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usage or 10.5% of the “universe” of 19,108 names given at least 3 times for
a given gender in a year between 1900 and 2002.
Appendix A.2. Media-based names
The presence of names on French Media are measured using data
for cinema, television and radio.
Movies
The movies that entered our data set, and their countries of origin,
were listed in “Best-sellers du marché français de 1945 à 2003,”
published online by the National Center of Cinematography (CNC).
While no longer available in the form we downloaded, an updated
version can be found in http://www.cnc.fr/CNC_GALLERY_CONTENT/
DOCUMENTS/publications/dossiers_et_bilan/306/ch01.pdf. Our sam-
ple comprises the 180 movies receiving the largest audiences in
France since 1945. Using the Internet Movie Database, imdb.com, we
obtained the given names and sexes of the three principal roles (as
ordered by IMDB) and the corresponding actors. Movie exposures
“turn on” in the year of release in France and continue for two years
thereafter. This extended effect is designed for movies that continued
to be shown in various theaters in the year after release andwere then
distributed on other media (e.g. VHS).
Television shows
For each of the non-pay channels in France—ORTF, TF1, Antenne2
(now France2), FR3 (France3), La Cinq (La Cinquieme/Arte), M6—we
record data for all shows covered on the websites www.leﬂt.com/
annuseries and encyclopedie.snyke.com. In most cases, we know the
release dates in France and the US. In cases where we do not know the
French release we set it at two years after the US release (the median
gap in the data where both release years are known). We also know
the number of seasons and assume that all seasons of the show are
exhibited in France. As with movies, the main three role and actor
names are taken from IMDB. This creates errors in the cases—mainly
in the 1960s—when the French changed the character names in a TV
show (e.g. Darrin was renamed Jean-Pierre in the French broadcast of
Bewitched). Exposure turns for the duration of the initial run of the
show on a non-pay station.
Songs
The website www.infodisc.fr provides, for a charge, the annual
Top 100 popular song list for France going back to 1955 (note that
the lists have fewer than 100 songs prior to 1959). The rankings
aggregate multiple charts and take into account both sales of singles
and radio play. We parsed the song title and the name of the
performer into their constituent “words.” We classiﬁed these words
as names if they met two criteria: i) actually used as baby names in
either France or the US, and ii) not among the most common 500
words in written French or English. Songs were classiﬁed as foreign if
the title consisted mainly of non-French words. In cases where the
title was a ambiguous (e.g. Michelle), we looked at the probable
nationality of the performer, or, in a few cases, at websites that
provide song lyrics. Exposure turns on only during the years a song is
in the Top 100 in France.
Appendix A.3. US names
The Social Security Administration tracks given names in the US and
makes them available on its website, www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/.
At the timewe downloaded the data, it provided the top 1000 names by
sex by decade back to 1900 and annual top-1000 names after 1990.
Appendix B. Additional regression and simulation results
Table B.8
Linear regression estimates of media effects of top 1000 American names, 1993–2002.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with a, b and c respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=21.1 (sample mean).
Table B.9
Media effects on French use of popular American names, 1993–2002.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with a, b and c respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=13.7 (sample mean).
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Table B.11
Simulated effects of media on renamings and welfare, 1993–2002.
Sex Media Dynamics # renamed % renamed Δ welfare
Females Foreign No 42,157.5 1.19 0.14
Yes 59,641 1.68 0.14
All No 62,801.5 1.77 0.22
Yes 86,626 2.45 0.21
Males Foreign No 63,567.5 1.7 0.20
Yes 88,528 2.36 0.20
All No 75,748 2.02 0.05
Yes 103,036.5 2.75 0.08
Table B.10
Media and non-media effects on French use of popular American names, 1993–2002.
Note: Standard errors (name–sex clustered) in parentheses with a, b and c respectively
denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. Sex–year dummies included in all
speciﬁcations. MM is the ratio of ℙkt with Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =1 to ℙ ̃kt with
Mkt=Mkt
F =Mkt
P =0. For speciﬁcation (6) MM sets Akt=13.7 (sample mean).
Table B.12
Names most helped by all media, 1967–2002.
Name Male Years
non-rare
Years
exposed
Simulated #
births
Actual #
births
(On−Off) /
Off
Media off Media on
Laura 0 36 17 33,517 117,913 251.8
David 1 36 35 86,296 287,812 233.52
Tia 0 4 4 32 105 229.2
Michael 1 36 35 28,475 85,245 199.37
Tom 1 35 30 9066 23,881 163.4
Lisa 0 36 23 13,251 34,098 157.33
Jonathan 1 36 20 38,448 98,436 156.02
Jennifer 0 36 28 25,524 63,831 150.09
Theo 1 36 16 22,753 54,213 138.27
Johnny 1 36 32 5645 13,446 138.19
Britney 0 4 3 58 136 134.99
Shakira 0 1 1 23 49 116.86
Calista 0 4 4 139 292 110.6
Xena 0 6 5 29 61 109.58
Tasha 0 3 3 5 10 93.35
Shannen 0 10 10 73 141 93.09
Anastacia 0 3 3 11 20 89.34
Jason 1 34 23 8161 15,314 87.65
Alan 1 36 30 7270 13,620 87.36
Tamera 0 2 1 20 37 86.42
Note: Actual and simulated # births are cumulated between 1967 and 2002. The
number of births has been rounded to the nearest unit, while the (On−Off) /Off
percentage is calculated before the rounding. “Years exposed” counts the number of
years that the name was non-rare and appeared on media.
Table B.13
Names most harmed by all media, 1967–2002.
Name Male Years
non-rare
Years
exposed
Simulated #
births
Actual #
births
(On−Off) /
Off
Media off Media on
Sebastien 1 36 2 468,649 294,439 −37.17
Paul 1 36 34 86,430 60,771 −29.69
Delphine 0 36 1 164,833 119,963 −27.22
Guillaume 1 36 6 263,542 194,493 −26.2
Julien 1 36 30 353,505 267,636 −24.29
Margot 0 32 0 26,467 20,592 −22.2
Emma 0 36 14 52,572 41,087 −21.85
Arthur 1 36 24 48,335 38,102 −21.17
Romain 1 36 3 197,121 155,590 −21.07
Charles 1 36 33 46,642 37,304 −20.02
Camille 0 36 11 140,999 113,999 −19.15
Anais 0 36 1 107,966 87,381 −19.07
Jeremie 1 36 0 33,919 27,695 −18.35
Charlotte 0 36 17 93,677 76,777 −18.04
Eva 0 36 20 36,663 30,222 −17.57
Victor 1 36 20 46,065 37,990 −17.53
Louis 1 36 29 57,074 47,256 −17.2
Celine 0 36 12 261,955 216,949 −17.18
Pierre 1 36 36 180,658 151,868 −15.94
Hugo 1 36 1 72,262 60,759 −15.92
Note: Actual and simulated # births are cumulated between 1967 and 2002. The
number of births has been rounded to the nearest unit, while the (On−Off) /Off
percentage is calculated before the rounding. “Years exposed” counts the number of
years that the name was non-rare and appeared on media.
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